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whether the regulation directly ad-
vanced the government's interest.
The lower court did not have the
benefit of a recent Supreme Court
case that provides the framework
for determining whether a regula-
tion directly advances the govern-
ment's interest. The Tenth Circuit
stated that on remand, the district
court must determine whether the
government demonstrated a con-
nection between its means, regulat-
ing alcohol content advertising,
and its interest, preventing
strength wars.
Finally, the appellate court stat-
ed that if the district court deter-
mined that the government's inter-
est in preventing strength wars was
directly advanced by the regula-
tion, then it must determine
whether the regulation was more
extensive than necessary to serve
this interest. Previously, the dis-
trict court concluded that the gov-
ernment could have chosen a much
less restrictive alternative, and
therefore, the regulation did not
satisfy the final element of the
Central Hudson test. The appellate
court maintained, however, that
the district court misinterpreted
the analysis of this final element by
using an incorrect standard. The
appellate court stated that the cor-
rect question was whether the regu-
lation was proportionate to the
interest being protected; the lower
court should have measured the
public's interest in disclosure
against the government's interest
in preventing strength wars to de-
termine whether the regulation was
overbroad. Therefore, the Tenth
Circuit remanded the case to the
district court for a redetermination
of these last two factors.
Barbara L. Gallagher
Reference To American
Arbitration Association
Rules In Home Warranty
Contract Makes
Arbitration Decision
Binding
In Rainwater v. National Home
Insurance Co., 944 F.2d 190 (4th
Cir. 1991), the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that an arbitration section of a
home warranty contract provided
for final and binding arbitration
since it was written pursuant to
American Arbitration Association
("Association") rules.
Background
When purchasing his home,
Charles Philip Rainwater ("Rain-
water") bought a Home Buyers
Warranty Contract with National
Home Insurance Company ("Na-
tional") as the underwriter. Includ-
ed in the warranty's coverage were
certain structural defects that must
first occur after the warranty was
purchased. Another section of the
warranty provided for arbitration
of disputes over National's cover-
age decisions. The warranty stated
that the Association would con-
duct any arbitration proceedings
according to the Association's
rules. Also, the disputing parties'
participation in arbitration was re-
quired before either party could
sue.
Within one year of buying his
house, Rainwater found a crack in
the foundation and filed a claim
under the warranty. National de-
nied coverage, deciding that the
foundation crack first occurred
prior to Rainwater's purchase of
the warranty. In response, Rainwa-
ter requested arbitration as provid-
ed for in the warranty contract.
After deciding that the founda-
tion crack had first occurred dur-
ing the warranty period and that it
was a qualified structural defect
under the warranty, the arbitrator
ordered National to repair the
foundation within sixty days. Fol-
lowing Association rules, National
appealed the award. The arbitra-
tor's decision was upheld.
National then sued in the Unit-
ed States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia seeking
a declaratory judgment that it was
not bound by the arbitration deci-
sion. The district court dismissed
National's suit, confirmed the arbi-
tration award, and in addition,
awarded Rainwater $206,500 for
reasonable costs of repair. Nation-
al appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.
Fourth Circuit's Decision
The Fourth Circuit first recog-
nized the longstanding federal pol-
icy of resolving any doubts con-
cerning the scope of arbitrable
issues in favor of arbitration. The
court also noted a presumption
that parties who agree to arbitra-
tion intend it to be binding. This
policy of favoring arbitration ex-
ists, the court stated, because arbi-
tration is an efficient and inexpen-
sive dispute resolution process that
does not take up valuable court
time.
In light of this policy, the Fourth
Circuit addressed whether Rain-
water and National had agreed that
the arbitration decision would be
binding or whether it would merely
serve as a condition precedent to
bringing litigation. This issue was
important because the court's ju-
risdiction to confirm the arbitra-
tion award stemmed from the par-
ties' agreement that the award was
final.
Rainwater argued that the
award was final because the arbi-
tration provision of the warranty
contract stated that Association
rules would apply to the arbitra-
tion process. Rule 26(c) of the
Association regulations provides
that unless otherwise provided by
law or the applicable document,
the parties involved shall be
deemed to have agreed that any
court having jurisdiction may en-
ter judgment confirming the arbi-
tration award. Rainwater contend-
ed that by adopting Association
rules, National agreed that a court
could confirm the arbitration
award and thus impliedly agreed
that the award was final.
The Fourth Circuit agreed, stat-
ing that other courts, including the
Seventh and Tenth circuits, had
found that if an arbitration agree-
ment referred to Association rules
and regulations the arbitration was
binding. The Fourth Circuit found
that the lack of explicit agreement
to be bound by arbitration was
inconsequential because reference
to Association rules, which do pro-
vide for such a binding effect,
implied such agreement.
National argued that the court
first must determine if the warran-
ty's arbitration provision stipulat-
(continued on page 64)
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ed that arbitration would be final
or binding. Only then could the
court rely on Association rules that
allow for entry of a confirmation
judgment. National contended
that although Association rules
make an arbitration award con-
firmable, they cannot, by them-
selves, make the award final.
The appellate court rejected Na-
tional's position and stated that it
would not require the presence of
magic words such as final or bind-
ing before enforcing arbitration
awards. The Fourth Circuit point-
ed out that courts generally look
for a reference to Association rules
to determine finality and only
when such guideposts are absent,
rely upon the presence of words
like final and binding.
National also argued that the
warranty contract expressly rebut-
ted the Association Rule 26(c) pre-
sumption of consent to entry of
confirmation judgment. According
to National, the warranty con-
tract's stipulation that the arbitra-
tion process was a prerequisite to
litigation was evidence that the
parties anticipated the possibility
of future litigation. Therefore, the
arbitration decision was not bind-
ing.
The Fourth Circuit disagreed,
finding that the language of this
contract provision was probably
left over from the days when courts
were hostile to arbitration clauses.
Drafters of arbitration agreements,
therefore, used this language to
insure that parties completed the
arbitration process before suing in
federal court. The Fourth Circuit
found that, in the warranty con-
tract in dispute, this language ap-
plied only to a court's ability to
enter a confirmation judgment or a
litigant's ability to use a final arbi-
tration award as part of some
larger litigation.
Lastly, the Fourth Circuit af-
firmed the lower court's award of
damages to Rainwater for the cost
of repairing the foundation.
Monica A. Murray
Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
Consumers Injured By
Meat Processor's False
Advertising Receive
Class Action
Certification Under
Lanham Act
In Maguire v. Sandy Mac, Inc.,
138 F.R.D. 444 (D.N.J. 1991), the
United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey certified
a consumer class action under the
Lanham Act for injuries caused by
false advertising but denied similar
class certification under the New
Jersey Racketeering Act, the feder-
al Racketeering Influenced Cor-
rupt Organizations statute, the
New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act,
and common law fraud.
Background
Sandy Mac, Inc. ("Sandy Mac"),
a federally inspected meat plant
that is no longer in business, for-
mally processed ham products for
resale through distributors and
wholesalers nationwide. From
1975 to 1987, Sandy Mac sold ham
products that it fraudulently repre-
sented as meeting the United
States Department of Agriculture
standards. Sandy Mac's ham prod-
ucts failed to meet U.S.D.A stan-
dards because the amount of water
added to the ham exceeded both
the amount represented on the
label and that which was permitted
by law. In 1989, Sandy Mac plead
guilty to criminal charges arising
out of its fraudulent conduct.
In 1990, Zane Maguire ("Ma-
guire"), a restaurant owner who
purchased ham products from
Sandy Mac during the relevant
time period, sued Sandy Mac on
behalf of a group of ham product
purchasers. Maguire asserted
claims against Sandy Mac under
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
1125(a); the New Jersey Racketeer-
ing Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:41-4
(West 1982); the federal Racke-
teering Influenced Corrupt Organi-
zations statute, 18 U.S.C. 1964(c);
the New Jersey Consumer Fraud
Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. 56:8-1 - 56:8-4
(West 1989); and common law
fraud.
The proposed class of ham prod-
uct purchasers was divided into
two subclasses. The first subclass
consisted of all persons who pur-
chased Sandy Mac's ham products,
removed the packaging supplied by
Sandy Mac, and thereafter resold
the ham in a modified condition.
Included within the first subclass
were all deli and restaurant owners
and large purchasers that sold the
ham products over the counter.
The second subclass consisted of
all ultimate consumers of Sandy
Mac's ham products who pur-
chased the products on a cost-per-
pound basis for home consump-
tion.
Consumers of restaurant or deli
sandwiches who purchased the
product for immediate consump-
tion were not included in either
subclass.
Consumer Standing Under the
Lanham Act
Before the district court reached
the issue of class certification, it
decided whether the consumers ac-
tually had standing to bring a Lan-
ham action. The first issue relevant
to standing was if the Lanham Act
created a right of action for people
who were not competitors.
The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
1125(a)(2), provides that, "any
person who, on or in any connec-
tion with any goods...or any con-
tainer for goods, uses in commerce
any ... false or misleading repre-
sentation of fact, which . .. in
commercial advertising or promo-
tion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities ... of his
or her goods shall be liable in a civil
action by any person who believes
that he or she is or is likely to be
damaged by such an act." Sandy
Mac argued that consumers could
not sue under the Lanham Act
because the Act only created a right
of action for competitors.
The federal courts disagree
about whether the Lanham Act
provides protection to consumers.
The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit, which
controls in this case, has held that
the Lanham Act should be broadly
construed to provide a remedy for
non-competitors. Thus, the district
court held that consumers have a
right to relief under the Lanham
Act.
The second issue the court ex-
64 Volume 4 Number 2/Winter, 1992
